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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
KOREA-USA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 
: A New Development Policy for Korea? 
 
By 
 
Noh, Joo-Hee 
 
 
 
The Roh Mu-Hyun government defined Korea as a “sandwich country” whose 
economy is being squeezed in the two powerful neighboring countries China and 
Japan, and as a quick remedy to get out of the sandwich situation, it pursued a free 
trade agreement (FTA) with the United States of America. In explaining the 
necessity of the Kor-U.S. FTA were three assumptions lied: (a) Korean economy is 
in need of a new development strategy; (b) The new development strategy shall 
incorporate policies to promote goods exports and to shock and advance services 
sector; (c) To achieve these goals, it is best to pursue a FTA with the U.S. among 
other trade partners. The first assumption is not ungrounded given the vicious cycle 
of low growth and bipolarization that has haunted the Korean economy since the 
1997 financial crisis, while the other two seem unfounded and even dangerous. 
Furthermore, detailed investigations into the text of the Kor-U.S. FTA present little 
substantive evidence that it will promote economic growth of Korea, but abundant 
evidence that it shall undermine Korea’s policy space for future development. In 
sum, it is questionable that the Kor-U.S. FTA will make a ‘good’ development 
policy package. Rather, the pact is highly possible to serve as a ‘dangerous’ lock-in 
tool that limits the government and other public entities’ rights and abilities to 
initiate, implement, modify, evaluate, and when necessary annul development 
policies in the future. 
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Ⅰ. INTRODUCTION  
 
Is South Korea a developing country or a developed country? The Roh Mu-Hyun 
government defines Korea as a ‘sandwich country’ whose economy is being 
squeezed in the two powerful neighboring countries, that is China (world’s most 
powerful developing country) and Japan (leading developed country). It is 
controversial whether the two economies threaten the Korean economy and/or help 
for further economic growth, yet it is widely agreed that Korea is in the midst of 
whether to become a developed country or remain among the developing countries 
group. In the sense, defining Korea as a sandwich country is not entirely wrong.  
Then, what would be the best development policies for a sandwich country 
to adopt in order to reap to a developed country? Before the academic arena seeked 
for answers and the public debates were brought for broader consensus, the Roh 
government gave one determined answer: a free trade agreement with the United 
Sates of America (hereafter the Kor-U.S. FTA). The governments of Korea and the 
U.S. launched the negotiations in early 2006 and the agreement was reached within 
one and a half a year. The two governments signed on the agreement on June 30, 
20071, and the final text of the agreement has been publicly available since the date 
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 At the moment, the agreement is waiting for the two congresses’ ratification. Details on the 
periodic bilateral meetings involving the negotiation of the Kor-US FTA are available on the official 
Websites of the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (www.ustr.gov) and the Korean Ministry of 
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July 2, 2007.  
 
The Roh government’s arguments for the Kor-U.S. FTA lies in three basic 
assumptions: (a) Korea is in need of a new development strategy to address both   
domestic challenges including low investments and high unemployment and 
international challenges including fiercer price competitions along with rise of new 
powerful developing countries, notably China; (b) The new development strategy 
shall incorporate policies to promote goods exports and to shock Korea’s services 
sector so as to advance itself; (c) To achieve these goals, it’s best to pursue a free 
trade agreement with the U.S. among other trade partners because it will provide 
Korean exporters with preferential market access to the world’s largest imports 
market, will make Korea’s services sector expose to world’s top-class services 
sector, and will attract U.S. investment and investors into Korea.  
 
The research questions of this paper are simplified into two: “Are those 
assumptions plausible?” and “will the Kor-U.S. FTA function as an appropriate 
trade policy contributing to Korea’s economic development?” In an effort to 
answer these questions, this paper first scrutinizes the current status of Korea’s 
                                                                                                                        
Foreign Affairs and Trade (www.mofat.go.kr). 
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economy and its economic relation with the U.S. and the global economy. And 
then, it deals with the above three basic assumptions that have been propagandized 
by the government to justify the seemingly hasty pursuit of the Kor-U.S. FTA. 
Finally, the paper goes into the official text of the FTA to picture how the 
agreement will affect the Korean economy in general and its development policies 
in specific.  
Why are these questions worthwhile? Indeed, these are critical questions 
that must have been discussed and whose answer should have been drawn upon 
people’s consensus before the embarking of the FTA negotiations. Unfortunately, it 
did not happen. Many of what is publicly available as serious research on the Kor-
U.S. FTA have been considered as little more than ex post rationalization2. 
The paper draws its results as follows: the Kor-U.S. FTA presents little 
sustentative evidence that it will promote economic growth for Korea, but 
abundant evidences that it might uproot industrial foundations and undermine 
national integrity, which are widely agreed to be among basic elements of sound 
economic development for a national economy. In other words, the Kor-U.S. FTA 
is not only a ‘questionable’ development policy given the current situations of the 
Korean economy and the world economy, but also a ‘possibly dangerous’ lock-in 
tool that will limit the government and other public entities’ rights and abilities to 
                                            
2 Lim (2006a). 
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initiate, implement, modify, and when necessary annul development policies in the 
future.  
 
 
Ⅱ. KOR-U.S. FTA AS A NEW DEVELOPMENT POLICY 
 
A. Korea in the ‘Second’ Development Phase 
  
South Korea has long been extolled as the most successful example of how 
international trade and trade policy can transform an underdeveloped country from 
a condition of widespread poverty to one of high-income countries in a single 
generation. Its success is recognized as largely due to the commonly shared goals 
of its people, supported by a relatively equal distribution of income over three 
decades of rapid growth. Korea was designated a “high-income” country by the 
World Bank and joined the Organization Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) in 1996. Indeed, Korea’s development performance has been the envy of 
the developing world. 
The glorious story seemed to end when it was hit by the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis. The 1997 real GDP growth rate of 6% plummeted to a negative 5% 
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in 1998, the first year of falling output since 1980. Unemployment rates more than 
doubled from 3.5% to 9%. Bankruptcies skyrocketed from under 1,000 per month 
in 1997 to over 3,300 in 19983.  
      But, to the repeated surprise to the world, Korea quickly recovered from the 
crisis and resumed its growth. Korea paid back most of the debt to the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) earlier than the due date. Its GDP growth rates were back to 
the pre-crisis level. Partially thanks to the devaluated Korean won, exports growth 
has been robust since the crisis except for in 2001 and 2002 when the U.S. 
economy was on the decline. Current account balance that has been negative since 
1990 turned positive after the crisis. Although the complete impacts of the crisis 
remains uncertain because it is still too early to evaluate, it seemed clear that Korea 
was again back on the track of its legendary economic development.  
It is worth noting that all the recoveries, in particular the robust growth in 
exports, were achieved when many economists and businessmen were concerned 
that Korea was losing its price competitiveness in the global trade arena because 
rising developing countries including so-called BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India and 
China) have taken over Korea’s share in the international market. 
 
                                            
3
 International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
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[Figure 1] Real GDP growth rates 
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Source: Bank of Korea (BOK). 
 
[Figure 2] Current account balance 
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Source: Bank of Korea (BOK). 
 
Nevertheless, this time Korea’s growth pattern showed whole different aspects 
from those of during the pre-crisis period. Above all, job growth was poor even 
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though the real GDP and exports were robustly growing. Unemployment rates that 
skyrocketed to 9 percent in 1998 were lowered but remained higher than the pre-
crisis level. The number of irregular laborers including part-timers who get paid 
lower wages and less job security continued to increase. Domestic total capital 
formation rates and total saving rates also remained lower than the past. In addition, 
real estate and land prices increased and the equities markets expanded, leading to 
a greater concentration of wealth and income. Gini’s coefficient has been 
constantly rising, proving less equal distribution of wealth and income. Many 
economists defined these new growth aspects of Korea’s post-crisis development 
as “jobless growth.” 
 
 
[Figure 3] Unemployment rates  
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Year
%
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Unemployment rates
Part-time employment as
a % of total employment
 
Source: Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), OECD Fact 
Book 2007, 2007. 
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[Figure 4] Savings and investment rates 
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Source: Bank of Korea (BOK). 
 
[Figure 5] Gini’s coefficient 
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Source: Korea Institute for Health and Social Affairs (KIHSA). 
 
Meanwhile, the outside atmosphere has not been friendly to the Korean economy. 
Competitions in the international markets has gotten fiercer as rising developing 
countries including BRICs and many other Asian countries such as Viet Nam 
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emerged as major players in the global trade arena. Many of manufacturing 
companies in Korea, in particular small and medium enterprises have been pressed 
for cutting down the expenses in order to survive in the competition with these 
economies armed with ‘cheap labor’. 
      Especially, there has been an outcry that emerging economies have take 
over Korea’s share in the U.S. manufacturing imports market, the world’s largest 
imports market. Given that the U.S. economy occupies 16.2 percent of the world 
imports in 2005, although it is quite down from 21.8 percent in the previous year4, 
Korea seemed to lose its past glory as a strong manufacturing country.  
      Yet, Korea’s services sector has remained left behind compared to those of 
developed countries, including the U.S., Japan and many of the European Union 
(EU) nations. When Korea’s productivity in services sector of the year 2000 is set 
at 100, those of the U.S., Japan, France, and Germany are calculated as 219.2, 
195.3, 199.9, and 180.4, respectively.  
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 International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
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[Figure 6] Comparison of productivity as of 2000 (Korea=100)  
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B. Kor-U.S. FTA as a Panacea for the Flawed Growth  
 
Those troubles are all new to Korea who led its economic development with 
relatively equal distribution of wealth and income, and with potential for more 
development. In this sense, it can be safely said that Korea entered a whole new 
development phase that can be titled as the ‘second phase of development’. 
Remind that the second phase is characterized by ‘jobless growth’, or ‘growth that 
fails to make people feel that they are actually benefiting from growth.’ Many 
scholars, politicians, and businessmen were concerned and warned that if these 
problems were not addressed, Korea would eventually break away even from this 
flawed development track.  
 11 
      It was in this complicated situation when the Roh Mu-hyun government 
took out the FTA with the U.S. The Roh government suggested that the Kor-U.S. 
FTA be a panacea for the troubled economy and went forward to insist that it will 
function as a new momentum for continued and strengthened economic 
development for the future.   
 
Initially, the Kor-U.S. FTA came as a shock not only to Korean people but also to 
the world, especially to Asian countries. In 2003 and 2004, the first two years of 
the Roh government’s term, the government’s trade policy evolved on two basic 
principles. First, it actively participated in the multilateral Doha Development 
Agenda (DDA) negotiations. Secondly, it pursued free trade agreements in two 
directions: it negotiated essentially “exploratory” free trade agreements with 
smaller countries that had a great deal of previous experience with free trade 
agreements and posed little threat to Korea’s vulnerable agricultural sectors. As a 
result, Korea signed on free trade agreements with Chile, Singapore, the European 
Free Trade Association (EFTA) and the Association of South East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) except for Thailand 5 . The Roh government also pursued more 
“strategic” free trade agreements with a view toward promoting peace and 
                                            
5
 Thailand was excluded because she was more protective for her agricultural sector than other 
countries expected. Negotiations with Thailand are still going on.  
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prosperity in Northeast Asia. A Korea-Japan FTA was given a top priority, and the 
possibility of a Korea-China FTA was cautiously explored. In this trade policy, the 
Kor-U.S. FTA was regarded as a long-term project. 
      Accordingly, only few people paid an attention to it when President Roh 
announced that the government would pursue a free trade agreement with the U.S. 
in the President’s New Year’s Speech in mid-January in 2006. But, it is in six 
weeks that it was realized. On February 3, 2006, the two governments of Korea 
and the U.S. officially announced the launching of the negotiations for the FTA. 
Even at that time, some conservatives who had blamed the Roh government for 
being anti-American did not believe that the Roh government had a real intention 
to pursue a FTA with the U.S. The Kor-U.S. FTA was this sudden. It was by that 
time when people started to raise questions of ‘what made the President swiftly 
change his trade policy’, and more importantly ‘why the Kor-U.S. FTA is needed at 
this time?’ 
 
The Roh government’s answers to these questions are investigated in the next 
section. To briefly summarize: the Kor-U.S. FTA will be a ‘panacea’ that can treat 
all the troubles the Korean economy confronts, and furthermore it will work as an 
‘alchemy’ that will turn the troubled economy which is get caught in between the 
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developing and developed worlds to a ‘real’ developed country. Note that ‘why and 
how the Korean economy fell into the above described troubles’ and in relation to 
it, ‘how she shall deal with the challenges’ are big issues that need to be widely 
discussed. Nonetheless, in this paper, these issues are put aside. Instead, it focuses 
only on how the Korean government relates these troubles to the Kor-U.S. FTA.  
 
 
Ⅲ. CRITICISM OF ASSUMPTIONS FOR THE KOR-U.S. FTA 
 
There are a number of reasons the Roh government presented in order to explain 
the seemingly abrupt pursuit of the Kor-U.S. FTA. This paper summarizes these 
reasons into three assumptions as followings: (A) In addressing the troubled 
economy, Korea needs a new development strategy different from previous ones; 
(B) the new development strategy should incorporate policies to promote goods 
exports and to advance Korea’s services sector; (C) tightening of Korea’s economic 
relation with the U.S., that is the Kor-U.S. FTA, will function as a package of 
development policies to serve all the purposes suggested in the assumption (B). In 
the section Ⅲ, these assumptions are investigated in details. 
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A. Korea Needs a New Development Strategy?  
 
Assumption A: Korea is in need of a new set of development policies in 
dealing with both domestic and international challenges to continue 
economic development and make it sustainable.  
 
Inside challenges can be explained by ‘potential growth rates’ that are projected to 
keep decreasing from 4.3 percent in 2010s to 1.4 percent in 2040s6. As is mentioned 
above, low investments and savings rates are considered a key challenge to the 
Korean economy. Lagging in job growth and high unemployment rates add another 
strain to the economy.  
Population aging is one of the most pressing issues considering that Korea 
has not much resource other than human resources. Korea already entered the group 
of “aging” societies and is anticipated to join the group of “aged” societies in mid-
2010. Population growth rates, which have been decreasing since 1970’s, are 
expected to be zero (0) in 2021 and turn to negative in the following year, and keep 
decreasing to reach negative 1.8 percent in 2050. Consequently, labor force is 
projected to keep decreasing while ratio of economically inactive population aged 
                                            
6
 Ministry of Finance and Economy(MOFE) of Korea. 
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65 and over to the total labor force aged 15~64 to skyrocket from 10.8 percent in 
2000 to 72.2 percent in 2060.  
Indeed, Korea has got to do something to address all the problems, unless it 
wants to get caught in a trap of decreasing growth rates.   
 
 
[Table 1] Forecasts for potential growth rates 
Years 2010s 2020s 2030s 2040s 
Potential growth rates (%) 4.3 2.9 1.8 1.4 
Source: The Ministry of Finance and Economy (MOFE) of Korea, “Evaluations on 3 Year’s 
Economic Management of the Chamyeo (means ‘participatory’) Government and its 
attendant Challenges”, 2006.  
 
[Figure 7] Population growth rates (2008~2050 data are forecasted)  
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[Figure 8] Population age composition (2008~2050 data are forecasted)   
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Source: National Statistical Office (NSO) of Korea. 
 
[Table 2] Ratio of inactive population aged 65 and over to the total labor 
force aged 15~64  
Year 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 
% 10.8 12.7 15.4 18.4 22.4 29 36.9 45.8 55.7 64.3 72.2 
Source: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), OECD Fact 
Book 2007, 2007. 
 
At the same time, outside challenges, which are essentially connected to the 
domestic challenges, do not put the Korean economy under less strain. Rather, 
outside challenges, well known to the public as ‘global outsourcing’ or ‘transfer of 
factories to overseas’, make the problems much more complicated. Newly 
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developing countries such as China and India, armed with ‘cheap labor’, have 
benefited from the new rules of game in the global market. By any measure it is a 
substantial problem to Korea. Korea is neither a cheap developing country that can 
sell inexpensive goods to the global market nor a fully developed country that is 
able to provide high-tech goods and quality services at higher prices. In the sense, 
Korea is a sandwich country that badly needs a breakthrough if it wants to keep its 
past fame as an ever-developing economy.   
 
The Roh government initially tried to solve the challenges it faced in two 
directions: (a) tightening of its economic ties with other Asian countries including 
China while economically and/or politically serving as a ‘balancer’ in the region; 
(b) investing more in human resources and social welfare system so that the 
foundations of economic growth are to be strengthened. The government even 
coined a term “Sahoe Chaeggim Gugga” (means ‘socially investing nation’ or 
‘government that invests in human resources’) as an ideal picture of the 
government.  
To the puzzlement to people, after less than 3 years’ trying to become the 
advertised ‘socially investing nation’, the government swiftly switched in an 
entirely different direction: (a) tightening of its economic ties with the U.S., 
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inevitably alienating other Asian countries, and even making China feel threatened; 
(b) re-adopting the ‘growth first, distribution later’ development philosophy of the 
old days.  
What has changed? There is not much to say about it, since it is still an 
enigmatic question both to those who support the Roh government and those who 
are against the government. It is just assumable that the Roh government 
completely changed its economic philosophy and accordingly altered its role in 
nation-level economic development. Roughly speaking, the Roh government 
changed its own identity from as an active developmental state (though its roles are 
defined different from those in the Park Jeong-hee regime) to as a classical night-
watch state that is active only in market liberalizations and deregulations. To put it 
differently, the Roh government’s newly adopted policy principle was to ‘let 
nation-level development policies die, and make the market substitute them’. This 
argument will be dealt with in the followings. 
 
B. The New Strategy Must Incorporate More Exports? 
 
Assumption B: Korea’s new development strategy shall involve strategic 
methods to promote ‘more exports’ because Korea’s past economic growth 
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has been dependent primarily on trade with the outside world; and the 
new strategy shall make the services sector left behind in the global 
market exposed to the fierce competition so that it is forced to drive itself 
toward self-innovation, because the services sectors are the true source of 
sustainable development for Korea. 
 
Indeed, it is true that Korea’s past success in economic development owed largely 
to exports. Yet, when its past development processes are looked back on, Korea 
never made a fetish of exports only. Quite the opposite, as most economic and 
development literatures widely agreed on.  
On the domestic level, active involvement of the Korean government in the 
development processes and its delicately carried-out industrial policies were 
recognized as major driving forces for rapid industrialization and sound 
development of the economy. More important were the contents and directions of 
the government’s industrialization and development policy. Since the 1960’s, 
Korea had adopted the export-promoting industrialization policies to utilize the 
international markets and to improve its competitiveness in the markets. At the 
same time, Korea strategically had protected infant industries, such as shipbuilding, 
steel, and telecommunications, until they grew enough to serve as a main driving 
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force for furthering growth.  
On the international level, open multilateral trading regime contributed to 
the expansion of Korean exports and eventually to the rapid development of the 
Korean economy. Korea could increase its exports as developed countries 
liberalized their markets through multilateral trade liberalization negotiations. This 
combination of open international markets and strategic protection of the Korean 
market for infant industries together made the glorious success story of the 
“Miracle on the Han River.”  
 
One cannot and should not insist that for further development, Korea has to do the 
same as in the past described above. First of all, Korea is not the underdeveloped 
country mourning over the scars of war any longer, meaning its development 
strategy should reflect on its changed economic status and conditions. And, as was 
already mentioned, situations in the global market have greatly changed since the 
1980’s. A number of developing countries, especially China, began to play as 
meaningful competitors of Korea. Also, as other countries competitively pursued 
regionalism, the Korean economy was warned that Korea’s traditional share in 
global export markets might shrink unless the economy finds out a breakthrough. 
Remind that regional economic arrangements are basically discriminatory in a 
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sense that only member countries get preferential treatments. Pro-FTAS 
emphasized that Korea, being left out of regionalism at the time, need do adopt 
epoch-making policies to address these issues.  
Nevertheless, exactly in the same manner, one cannot and should not echo 
that the Korean economy cannot survive without more exports because its 
development was heavily indebted to trade in the past. Although increased exports 
sound very nice, it is not something blindly pursued because more exports by itself 
cannot make a development goal. Rather, it needs to be incorporated in a bigger 
picture of development strategy, so that it can contribute to the higher development 
goals. Also, before certain trade policies are introduced, various other factors need 
to be taken into account in relation to exports promotion, including exchange rates, 
terms of trade, trade disputes and so on. 
 
Now, let us turn to the services sector, in specific. As was discussed above, it is 
true that Korea’s services sector has been left behind in the global market, and 
balance of services trade, though it had been negative since 1990, has more 
exacerbated after the 1997 financial crisis. Certainly, if Korea’s services sector 
develops to the level of the developed world, it would benefit the Korean economy. 
But, again, “services sector upgrade” projects needs to be incorporated in a bigger 
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development picture. There are many things to be considered, for example, 
balancing of policies to promote manufacturing industry and policies to services 
industry. 
    In relation to the advancing of the services sector, it is most widely 
propagandized by the Roh government that the benefits of the Kor-U.S. FTA 
includes ‘improvement in economic efficiency, especially in services sector’. 
Unfortunately, it is the Korean government’s ‘hope’ at best. No development 
literature says an economy shall adopt ‘external shock’ as a major policy tool to 
develop its own industry. Besides, the traditional economic theories echo that in 
the free trade world, if your services sector is inferior to that of your competitor, 
you are supposed to specialize in something else, say manufacturing sector. Also, it 
is worth noting that the final text of the Kor-U.S. FTA shows that the critical 
service sectors, that the government has insisted need to upgraded, such as legal 
services, are not actually liberalized.  
 
On top of that, it needs to be paid an attention that Korea’s trade volume kept 
growing even after the 1997 financial crisis, though there were some periodical 
fluctuations. Also, the shares of trade in GDP continued to grow, too. In 2004, trade 
volume amounted to more than 40 percent of GDP for the first time in history of 
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Korea. Although the Roh government emphasized in pro-FTA talks that exports 
growth came to a stalemate, it was only in relation to the U.S. market. As a whole, 
Korea’s exports both in volume and weight have been growing when the free trade 
agreement with the U.S was non-existent7.  
It can not be overemphasized that Korean economy’s pressing problem is 
not that its exports performance has been poor, that is not true as statistics show, 
but that although exports have been robustly growing despite of fiercer 
competitions in the international market, recently plummeting won/dollar exchange 
rates and skyrocketing oil prices, it has not translated into domestic demand. It is 
symbolic that when Samsung and Hyundai export more than 100 millions of cell 
phones and 1 million of automobiles in a year (since 2005), Korea’s national 
economy as whole suffers from slowdown in domestic demand and high 
unemployment. Also it needs to be noted that when Chaebols has grown as global 
players, small and medium enterprises has been trapped in a vicious circle of low 
investment and low growth. Indeed, the famous ‘export-driven growth’ and 
‘trickling-down effect’ vanished in the development story of the Korean economy. 
In short, the Korean economy suffers not because it exports less than the 
past but because although exports are robustly growing, it is enjoyed by only a few 
                                            
7
 It by no means implies that the Kor-U.S. FTA is of no use in promoting exports. This argument 
needs more elaborations.  
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and there are too many left-behinds. Therefore, the second argument that the Kor-
U.S. FTA is needed because the Korean economy needs more exports is entirely 
misleading.  
 
[Figure 9] Exports of goods and services 
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Source: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), OECD Fact 
Book 2007, 2007. 
 
[Figure 10] Trade in goods and services as a percentage of 
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Source: Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), OECD Fact 
Book 2007, 2007. 
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C. Tightening of Korea’s Tie with the U.S. is the Answer? 
 
Assumption C: Korea must restructure its economic system to be more 
competitive in high-tech industries and service sectors, and to improve its 
overall economic efficiency. For these objectives, it’s best to pursue a free 
trade agreement with U.S. among other trade partners. 
 
The third assumption is simple: Free trade agreement with the U.S. will provide the 
best solution to all the above mentioned troubles the Korean economy is currently 
facing. Reasons that the government suggests are many8, but for the purpose of 
simplifying the argument, let’s suppose all the advertised benefits of the Kor-U.S. 
FTA will be realized. Then, the question is: “Still, is having a tighter economic 
relation with the U.S. a good thing in the mid-term and long-term development 
prospective?”  
 
The answer is negative. It is because even if those economic benefits are realized 
as a result of the Kor-U.S. FTA, it may not be the end of the story. The U.S. 
economy itself is at stake and it does not show the sign of a favorable turn. It can 
                                            
8
 For the purpose of simplifying the arguments, political considerations are put aside in this paper. 
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be said that tightening Korea’s relation with this troubled economy cast another 
strain on the Korean economy. 
In order to understand what it implies, it is a must to understand the 
notorious “twin deficits” of the U.S. economy that have not shown any sign of 
alleviation. Since 1990, current account deficit and financial deficit of the U.S. 
have been negative, and in recent 5 years of the second term of the George W. 
Bush’ administration, it has enormously exacerbated to over 10 percent of GDP. 
How this heavily indebted country can survive is the world’s troublesome, and it 
needs to be understood in relation to the Kor-U.S. FTA.  
The way the U.S. survives regardless of the huge debts is all inter-wined 
with other economies through so-called “dollar-recycling” process: Countries, 
mostly Asian countries, export cheap goods to the U.S. and the U.S. people buy 
them even on debt [generation of current account deficit]. Countries send U.S. 
dollars they earn through exports back too the U.S. by buying the U.S. bonds, and 
then the U.S. government spends the dollars in securing financial deficits [securing 
of financial deficit]. But, the U.S. government again borrows money from foreign 
countries because of tax cut, wars, etc. [re-generation of financial deficit]. Because 
the dollars the U.S. government spends stimulate the economy, the U.S. people 
again go to shopping to buy imports goods [re-generation of current account 
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deficit]. This dollar recycling process is far from sound debt management, but it 
has miraculously worked for the U.S. economy and the global economy for recent 
10 years9.  
The Kor-U.S. FTA is only to strengthen this abnormal dollar-recycling 
situation, placing Korea as the “stake country” propping up this unsound system.  
 
[Figure 11] Current account and financial balances of the U.S. 
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In fact, we don’t have to look into the U.S. grave economic situations and all. As is 
clear in any economic literature, it is risky to put all the eggs in one basket. In this 
multi-power governing world, diversification of economic relations to many 
different economies including China is a must. And it was what the Roh 
                                            
9
 It is because the U.S. economy has benefited from ‘seigniorage’. But the situation is changing. 
EURO has grown, Japanese Yen has gotten back its past power, and other currencies are growing, 
too. Many predicts that the time is not far when other countries will stop buying the U.S. bond.. 
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government sought in the early term before pursuing the Kor-U.S. FTA.  
Recall the experience of Mexico that signed on the FTA with the U.S and 
Canada in 1993. The FTA titled as “North America Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA)” entered into force on January 1, 1994, and shortly tightened the 
economic relation between Mexico and the U.S. But it was only Mexico whose 
economy is smaller and less developed than the U.S. economy that started to suffer 
from “economic coupling.” It means if there is little downturn of the U.S. economy, 
its impacts on the Mexican economy is relatively huge. For instance, in 2001~2002 
when the U.S. economy fell into stagnation, the Mexican economy almost lose its 
GDP by 1 point percent. Remind that there are many signs that the U.S. economy 
is again falling into the stagnation at a time when the Korean government is trying 
to tie its economic relation with the U.S. economy even stronger than any other 
country did in the past. 
      In this sense, it is too early to judge but it ‘might’ be a good thing that 
Korea’s dependency rates on trade with the U.S. has decreased since 2000, and its 
share in the U.S. imports market diminished from 3.3 percent in 1995 to 2.5 
percent in 2006. Still, Korea’s exports are growing and current account balance 
remains positive.      
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[Figure 12] Korea’s dependency rates on trade with the U.S. 
19.2
20.1
18.4
17.7
15.8 15.5
13.2
12.1
0
5
10
15
20
25
1998 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Year
%
Source: The Ministry of Finance and Economy (MOFE) of Korea.  
 
[Figure 13] The U.S. imports market shares: Korea, Japan, and China 
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Ⅳ. INVESTIGATION OF THE KOR-U.S. FTA TEXT 
 
In the section Ⅲ, the three assumptions behind the government’s explanation of 
the pursuit of the Kor-U.S. FTA were criticized. In the section Ⅳ, we’ll leave from 
the fictitious world of assumptions for the real world. Since the FTA negotiations 
were reached upon agreement on June 30, 2007, it is possible to look into the 
results of the agreement. Again, the paper focuses on the Kor-U.S. FTA as a 
development policy. In a broader sense, the pursuit of the Kor-U.S. FTA is not 
merely one trade policy that is part of whole economic/development policy 
package, but the agreement itself is a package. Recall that President Roh Mu-hyun 
declared several times “the FTA with the U.S. is a must for next generations to 
prosper.” 
Two major arguments are to be presented in this section to show that Kor-
U.S. FTA will not make the best development policy package for Korea: (A) The 
Kor-U.S. FTA is expected to bring less tangible benefits to the Korean economy 
than is expected; (B) The Kor-U.S. FTA in essence limits the government and other 
public entities’ rights and abilities to adopt, implement, modify, evaluate and when 
necessary annul development policies. 
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A. Less Tangible Benefits for the Korean Economy 
 
The Kor-U.S. FTA itself has been propagandized by the Roh government almost as 
a synonym of economic growth. That is, if the FTA enters into force, GDP will 
grow, more jobs will be created, and the system of the Korean economy will be 
upgraded so as to prop up further growth. To strengthen these arguments, the 
government has quoted and advertised the results of research on the economic 
effects of Kor-U.S. FTA that was performed by the Korea Institute of Economic 
Policy (KIEP). To sum up its results: the Kor-U.S. FTA will bring in 7.75 point 
percent of GDP growth and 3.3 point percent of job growth over approximately 
next 10 years from when the pact takes effect10.  
      First of all, it is necessary to recognize what kind of economic model is 
used to draw such results. It is the Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model 
that the KIEP adopted to simulate the broad economic effects of the Kor-U.S. FTA. 
The CGE model provides an economy-wide framework for analysis that takes into 
account the interdependencies that exist both within and between countries. The 
framework is essentially microeconomic in character. When the CGE models 
incorporate data covering the sectoral production, trade, and employment of the 
                                            
10
 KIEP(2006). 
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components countries together with measure of import tariffs and other forms of 
trade barriers, it is possible to simulate the economic effects of various patterns of 
trade liberalization. The utility of the CGE model as a tool to estimate economic 
impacts of trade liberalization has been well recognized in the academic arena11.  
      Nonetheless, the limits of the CGE model must not be overlooked. It is 
important to understand that the CGE modeling simulation results provide 
indications of the potential economic changes involved. They are not meant to be 
empirical forecasts or predictions of the changes because they are not derived from 
econometric methods that can yield statistically based estimations. Furthermore, 
because they are microeconomic in character, CGE models of necessity abstract 
from the macroeconomic forces at work at the aggregate level in individual 
countries. As a consequence, it may be very difficult to compare CGE modeling 
results with the actual changes that occur in the economic variables over given 
periods of time. A further important consideration is that CGE models used to 
analyze the effects of trade liberalization may differ because of the assumptions 
that characterize their framework, although the commonly assumed economic 
structure is standard: perfect competition, constant returns to scale, and fully 
employed factors that can move freely across sectors but not across international 
                                            
11
 Alan V. Deardorff and Robert M. Sterm(1990). 
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boundaries12.  
This is why various other CGE modeling results say all different stories 
about the effect of the Kor-U.S. FTA: McDaniel and Fox(2001) estimated that as of 
2005 the Kor-U.S. FTA would increase Korean economic welfare by 0.69 percent 
point of the GDP. Choi and Schott(2001, 2004) summarized that Korea’s economic 
welfare would rise by 0.91 percent point of the GDP and 2.41 percent point of the 
GDP, respectively in two researches. Lee and Lee(2005) analyzed that Korea 
would enjoy 0.42~2.27 percent point of the GDP if the FTA enters into force. 
Finally, in Schott, Bradford, and Moll(2006), Korea’s welfare is estimated to 
increase by 0.6~6.6 percent point of the GDP. The numbers derived are all positive 
because of the CGE modeling’s nature, but all of them are lower than that of the 
KIEP.  
 
In essence, it is meaningless to try to decide which result is the best estimate of the 
impacts of the Kor-U.S. FTA on the Korean economy. Rather, this paper tries to 
explain expected returns of the Kor-U.S. FTA to Korea will be less than estimated, 
based on the actual negotiation results of the agreement. The paper investigates 
four areas, which are (a) trade in goods, (b) trade in services, (c) foreign 
                                            
12
 In my point of view, any CGE model is supposed to yield results that are not plausible at all 
because of its reliance on fictitious assumptions which can never be realized in the real economy.  
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investment, and (d) intellectual property.   
   
Trade in Goods    
 
By nature, the Kor-U.S. FTA is expected to increase Korea’s exports to the U.S. It 
is because when the free trade agreement enters into force, U.S. tariffs levied on 
imports goods made in Korea are to be eliminated to zero (0) or reduced in the due 
period of time. But it alone cannot justify a bilateral free trade agreement because 
if it’s the case, Korea’s best trade policy must be to open the economy to as many 
economies as possible.  
Also, what is clear is that if the FTA increases Korea’s exports to the U.S. 
market, it increases imports from the U.S. to the Korean market, too. What matters 
is net change in current account balance, not just change in exports volume. 
Unfortunately yet obviously, more imports from the U.S. are not expected to be 
offset by even more exports to the U.S. It is primarily because the weighted 
average tariff on the U.S. goods is 5.7 percent point higher than that on the Korean 
goods13. It implies that the U.S. will export more to Korea than Korea will do to 
the U.S. when the FTA enters into force, and most related researches publicly 
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 Korea Customs Service (KCS). 
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available say so14. 
 
[Table 3] Tariff: Korea vs. the U.S. as of 2004 
 Korea U.S. Difference 
Average tariff 11.9% 4.9% 7.0point %  
Weighted average tariff 7.2% 1.5% 5.7point % 
Source: Korea Customs Service (KCS). 
 
In most cases, the differences of tariffs between two countries are incorporated in a 
CGE model. But, when looking into the specific results of the negotiations on tariff 
and non-tariff barriers elimination, there are many others that are missing in the 
model but need to be paid attention.  
Above all, the automobile industry, which has been referred as the greatest 
“winner” of the Kor-U.S. FTA on the Korean side will not gain much from the 
agreement. According to the tariff eliminations schedule of the U.S., tariffs on most 
of Korea’s automobiles and related commodities is to be removed from current 8 
percent to zero (0) immediately or within 3 years after the FTA enters into force15. 
But by that time, Hyundai Motor and Kia Motors, two Korean auto makers, will 
have finished building their assembly lines in the U.S. and their total output is 
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 Refer to KIEP(2006). 
15
 Annex 2-B: Tariff Elimination.   
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expected to exceed the total exports to the U.S. market. It means that they don’t 
need preferential tariff treatment exclusively given to the free trade agreement 
countries, because what they produce is “made in the U.S.” 
 In case of textiles and apparels industries, another “winner” of the FTA on 
the Korean side, many of commodities is not expected to enjoy preferential FTA 
tariff treatment because the Kor-U.S. FTA adopts the U.S.’s unique “yarn-forward” 
rules of origins16. When these stricter origins rules17 are applied, many of textiles 
and apparels goods of Korea, whose origins can be decided as ‘Korea’ when other 
general rules of origins are applied, are classified into “made in China” or made in 
somewhere else other than Korea.  
All other major export commodities of Korea including semi-conductors, 
steel and chemistry products already enjoy zero (0) or pay very low tariffs18. White 
electronics such as refrigerator, laundry mat, TV sets have already been made in 
the U.S.-Mexico border “Maquiladora” industrial region that enjoys the NAFTA’s 
preferential tariff treatment. Again, what they produce is not “made in Korea” but 
either “made in Mexico” or “made in the U.S.,” and therefore won’t benefit from 
                                            
16
 Annex 4-A: Specific Rules of Origin for Textile or Apparel Goods, and Chapter 6 Rules of 
Origins. 
17
 According to the official text, yarn-forward rules of origins defines “wholly finished and 
formed” textile and apparel goods as those whose “production process and finishing operations, 
beginning with the extrusion of filaments, strips, film, or sheet, including drawing to fully orient 
filament or slitting a film or sheet into strip, or the spinning of all fibers into yarn, or both, and 
ending with a finished yarn or a filed yarn.” 
18
 Korea Customs Service (KCS). 
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the Kor-U.S. FTA. 
In addition, Korea did not success in winning anything substantial in trade 
remedy negotiations. U.S. notorious trade remedy measures such as ‘zeroing’ 
survived the negotiations, and Korea failed to make the U.S. to adopt ‘lesser-duty 
rule’ and ‘non-cumulation’ that are generally accepted rules in the global trade 
arena when lost revenue due to dumping is calculated19. To make matters worse, 
the official text prescribes that two parties can apply a ‘safeguard’ measure ‘only 
once’20, which any previous FTA had not adopted. Remind that Korean industries 
have continuously reported that what substantially hamper their exports to the U.S. 
are the country’s unique non-tariff barriers such as anti-dumping measures, 
counter-veiling duties and safeguards, not tariff barriers. The estimated amount of 
damage incurred by U.S. trade remedy measures is 27.2 billion dollars during 
1981~2005, and it amounts to 6.8 percent of the total exports to the U.S.21 
 
In the meantime, imports from the U.S. will be expected to grow substantially. 
Agricultural products of U.S. mega-agribusiness corporations are on the front, 
threatening Korean farmers who have been suffered from globalization. In 
                                            
19
 Chapter 10 Trade Remedies. 
20
 ‘Article 10.2: Conditions and Limitations’ makes it clear that “Neither Party may apply a 
safeguard measure more than once against same good.”  
21
 The Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy (MOCIE) of Korea.  
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particular, the Korean beef market, once the third-largest market for U.S. beef22, 
was opened as a preliminary condition to launch the negotiations, regardless of 
existing threat of mad cow disease (Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy), though 
the government insisted several times the beef market opening was nothing to do 
with the Kor-U.S. FTA. Despite the market opening, the U.S. beef importers could 
not sell their beef products in Korea because they could not meet the agreed 
imports conditions that only beef without bone from cattle less than 30 months of 
age. Accordingly, the U.S. Congress and the U.S. Trade Representative have 
insisted that ‘without full opening of the Korean beef market, there would be no 
Kor-U.S. FTA.’23 And the Korean government has continuously eased the beef 
imports and quarantine restrictions.  
Another ‘loser’ of the Kor-U.S. FTA on the Korean side is Korea’s 
pharmaceutical industry. It is because the FTA adopts a number of measures 
including “Patent Linkage” to extend the patent period, which is favorable to the 
U.S. pharmaceutical industries, together with various measures such as 
“Independent Review Process” to make it difficult for Korean pharmaceutical 
companies to produce generics at cheaper prices24.  
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 USTR(2006).  
23
 Wendy Cutler, the U.S. chief negotiator of the Kor-U.S. FTA repeatedly declared on October 16, 
2007 that “For the Kor-U.S. FTA to get approval from the U.S. Congress, Korea must open its beef 
market fully.”   
24
 Refer to Chapter 5 Pharmaceutical Products and Medical Devices, and Chapter 18 Intellectual 
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Actually, there are many more losers other than agriculture and 
pharmaceutical industries. Most notably, precision machinery and chemistry, and 
parts industries need to be paid attention in relation to Korea’s future development 
policies. Those three industries have been spotlighted as core high value-added 
industries Korea shall develop strategically for future growth. But because Korea’s 
competitiveness in these industries is absolutely lower than that of the U.S. and 
other developed countries, those industries are considered to be infant industries 
not strong enough to survive open competition and therefore to be protected. In 
terms of industrial policy, the Kor-U.S. FTA can be a ‘misleading’ policy to threat 
these strategically important yet weak industries25. Regarding on this criticism, the 
Roh government repeats that same argument it uses in services-sector related 
debates: ‘Once those industries are forced to compete with those of the U.S., they 
will advance themselves to survive.’   
 
Cross-border Trade in Services 
 
Another strain will be put on cross-border trade in services26. The Roh government 
                                                                                                                        
Property Rights.  
25
 Actually, whether these industries survive and develop enough to compete with the developed 
world was one of very controversial issues that were debated in the Korea-Japan FTA discussions. 
At that time, many worried that Japan that has comparative advantage in those industries would 
threat Korea’s strategic industries. 
26 It is only 20 years ago when services were first incorporated in the trade issues. And its relevant 
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has explained that the Kor-U.S. FTA will shock the services sector of Korea, and 
consequently upgrade the sector’s level. According to the government, it is because 
when the Kor-U.S. FTA enters into force, Korea’s services sector shall advance its 
services quality enough to compete with world’s top class services of the U.S., and 
the U.S. services sector will expand into Korea’s domestic market and transfer its 
developed services techniques. Unfortunately, the latter argument is not right. One 
of the core principles of the Kor-U.S. FTA regarding on cross-border trade in 
services is to forbid the U.S. corporations to be bind to any obligations including 
initiating and transferring of techniques27. Meanwhile, the former argument was 
already criticized in the section Ⅲ. Traditional trade theories say that trade helps 
countries achieve development by promoting the sectors of the economy where 
individual country possesses a comparative advantage, whether in terms of labor 
efficiency or factor endowments. When manufacturing and services productivities 
of Korea are set at 100 respectively, those of the U.S. are calculated as 160.8 and 
219.228. It implies that the Kor-U.S. FTA is deemed to result in Korea specializing 
in manufacturing where there is Korea’s comparative advantage whilst the U.S. 
specializing in services29. It is exactly the opposite the government’s objective to 
                                                                                                                        
rules are first established only mid-1990, and they are still controversial.   
27
 Chapter 12 Cross-border Trade in Services.  
28
 Korea Productivity Center (KPC). 
29
 Within manufacturing, Korea is supposed to specialize in wide-use manufacturing while the U.S. 
in high-tech and high-class manufacturing. The government has insisted that the FTA will be one 
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pursue the Kor-U.S. FTA.  
In addition, professional services, that many experts have insisted should be 
liberalized among all other services for the sake of its own development in the 
global competitive market and of Korean consumers’ benefits, were relatively well 
protected under the FTA text. Legal services, accounting and auditing services, tax 
accounting services are all included in the reservation list30. The Roh government 
insisted that it is because the government had its own unilateral liberalization plans 
which are already going through the process. This argumentation is at best crude, 
because then all other services sector can be opened to the global competitive 
market without the enforcement of the Kor-U.S. FTA31. 
      Another argument to be criticized is that many deregulation measures in 
services sector that are stated in the FTA text, that the government calls an 
“opportunity of advancement,” will function as a critical promoter for development 
of services sector. This argument is not right, either. It is like to say that ‘because 
the Korean government is not capable of adopting deregulation policies for itself, it 
should bind all the policies to an external trade pact so that they can be 
compulsory.’ The World Bank and the IMF have made wide use of these kinds of 
                                                                                                                        
and the only chance for Korea to specialize in high-class manufacturing, to beat China and India. 
30
 Refer to Annex ⅠNon-conforming Measures for Services and Investment (reservations to 
existing measures) and Annex Ⅱ Non-conforming for Services and Investment (reservations to 
future measures). 
31
 Besides, some literatures such as Song(2007) have insisted that what the government calls the 
unilateral liberalization plans are actually disguised forms of protective measures for those sectors.   
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liberalization and deregulation conditionality linked to loans and rescue finances to 
developing countries to secure and lock-in their reforms and restructurings, but any 
independent sovereign country adopts these ‘lock-in’ measures in initiating a 
policy32. If Korea needs a certain deregulation policy for development of services 
sector, it can and must adopt it on its own.   
  
Situations of financial services are a bit different from those of other services33. All 
the negotiation results for Korea are evaluated to be in line with so-called the 
“Northeast Asian Financial Hub” project and other related financial policies 
including the introduction of the ‘Capital Market Unification Law’ that will enter 
into effect coming 200934. It implies the Kor-U.S. FTA is cautiously designed to 
promote and lock-in the ongoing financial liberalization policies of the Roh 
government. The FTA and the government’s financial polices share the very basic 
idea that getting rid of any barrier that gets in the way of investors, whether foreign 
or domestic, and their investment is always good for the economy35. 
  
                                            
32 It is a bit controversial at the moment but it is fair to say that thanks to the democratization of 
Korea in 1987, Korea now has a self-control power over its own reforms and restructurings. 
33
 Chapter 13 Financial Services. 
34
 Hong(2007). 
35
 It will be discussed more in the following ‘Investor-State Dispute (ISD)’ section. 
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Foreign Investment 
 
Another rationale for the Kor-U.S. FTA is that it will enlarge the volume of foreign 
investments into Korea that has been suffering low domestic investments and 
savings. At glance, it seems a rational argument. It is because the text of the Kor-
U.S. FTA adopts the strongest protective measures for foreign investment (i.e. 
introduction of the investor-state dispute settlement mechanism) and contains few 
obligations levied on the investment into Korea (i.e. ban on performance 
requirements)36. Also, the FTA text incorporates many incentives for the U.S. 
investors to consider commercial presence inside Korea37. 
      Nonetheless, it needs to be recalled that there is no evidence that more 
foreign investment automatically translates into growth for a national economy. As 
was clearly shown in the Lone Star’s case, foreign investment can be misused for 
foreigners to make financial profits in one country and swiftly leave the country 
without considering its impacts on the economy, rather than to make profits 
through sound investment leading to production and job growths that help the 
economy. It is a well-known fact that since financial market liberalization began 
during the Lee Yong-sam’s reign, approximately half of foreign investments into 
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 Refer to Chapter 11 Investment and Chapter 13 Financial Services. 
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 Hong(2007). 
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Korea proved to be short-term investment portfolios aiming for financial profit at 
securities markets or marginal profit derived from hostile M&As38. In Mexico’s 
case, after the NAFTA entered into force in 1994, approximately 70 percent of 
foreign investment flowed into stock markets, while only 30 percent of foreign 
investment was directly invested in factories, machines and equipments39.  
Of course, it is not an issue in this paper what should be characteristics of 
‘good’ foreign investment. However, it cannot be overemphasized that if the 
Korean government has a policy objective to attract more foreign investment, it 
should go hand in hand with a broader policy objective and its relevant 
incentive/punishment measures to make foreign capital translate into ‘real’ 
development of the country. Unfortunately, it is hard to find this kind of well-
formulated policy scheme in relation to foreign investment in the final text of the 
Kor-U.S. FTA.   
Furthermore, it should be noted that substantial amount of what foreign 
investment get in a country is actually coming back to its originating country in 
forms of profits and dividend, rather than to be re-invested in the invested country. 
And the FTA text is makes it clear that nothing can prevent foreign investors from 
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brining their money back home40. Mexico’s case again suggests an implication. 
During the 1990s when foreign investment skyrocketed supposedly thanks to 
embarking of the NAFTA, 55.6% percent of foreign direct investment into Mexico 
drained back to the U.S. in forms of profits and dividends41. 
 
Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) 
 
It is an international agreement that the level of intellectual property right (IPR) 
protection is to balance the incentives necessary to encourage future innovations 
against the desire to provide wide access to those products in a competitive market. 
Nevertheless, when the Kor-U.S. FTA text in relation to intellectual property rights 
is investigated, it seems clear that the ‘incentives’ side of IPR protection was over-
represented. The text includes the strongest protective measures for intellectual 
property rights. For example, after 2 years from when the agreement goes into 
effect, the term of a protection of a work, performance, and a phonogram is 
extended to 70 years after the author’s death, from current 50 years after death42. 
Because the pact affirms “the existing obligations with respect to each other under 
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42
 Article 18.4 Copyrights and Related Rights. 
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the TRIPs (Trade Related Intellectual Properties) Agreement”43 and at the same 
time adopts some new measures that go beyond the TRIPs agreement, the Kor-U.S. 
FTA is called a ‘TRIPs plus’ agreement when it comes to IPR.  
      Needless to say, the results shall be asymmetry for two parties. Most of the 
strong IPR protective measures included in the text will serve to benefit the U.S. 
knowledge-based industries, notably its world’s top class entertainment and 
pharmaceutical industries, while do damage on the Korean economy whose 
knowledge-based industries’ competitiveness is incomparably weaker. Note that 
approximately 60 percent of the U.S. imports are coming from knowledge service 
industries, and Korea is second-largest imports market (17%) for the U.S. 
knowledge services44. The World Bank made it clear in its annual report in 2002 
that when full application of TRIPs is applied, the greatest winner will be the U.S. 
and the biggest loser Korea. The report says, “Korea would register the largest net 
outward transfer of some $15.3 billion because of the large rise in volume of 
patents registered there.” The report goes on to say, “overwhelmingly the United 
States would gain the most income in terms of static rent transfers, with a net 
inflow of some $19.1 billion per year. U.S.-headquartered firms owned numerous 
patents in many countries that were required by TRIPS to strengthen their 
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intellectual property protection, while U.S. law was subject to little change.”45 It 
did not come as a surprise when the USTR Industry Advisory Committee on 
Intellectual Property Rights said in the report on the Kor-U.S. FTA to the President 
and the Congress on April 27, 2007, “(we) applaud Korea for agreeing to higher 
level of protection, by incorporating in the agreement all the obligations set forth in 
the WIPO Copyright Treaty and WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty 
(WPPT).”46  
      Even the Korean government recognized that the Kor-U.S. FTA would 
incur substantial damage to the economy. 11 government-run institute, headed by 
the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP), estimated that the 
amount of damage was to be average 150 billion ~ 380 billion Korean won (17 
million ~ 43 million U.S. dollars) each year for next 10 years. But, IPR-related 
organizations and industries insisted the amount of the damage shall be much 
larger. ‘Korean Alliance against the Kor-U.S. FTA’, the coalition of over 400 civil 
organizations in Korea that oppose to the Kor-U.S. FTA, estimated the damage on 
the IPR-related sector should be as much as 2.2 trillion won a year for next 10 
years.    
      What is worse, the IPR-incurring damage will be discriminatory in terms of 
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those who are affected. It is because the economically and socially weaker tend to 
be more vulnerable when it comes to strengthening of the IPR protection. While 
Chaebols and large companies are capable of bearing the raised IPR standards, 
small and medium companies and individuals aren’t. The most hardly hit group 
will be patients who suffer from an incurable disease because of high price of 
medicines that otherwise could be lowered.    
  
Still, if all the damage is for the benefit of the whole economy and adequate 
redistribution and social protection polices go in hand in hand with the raising of 
the IPR standards, even the ‘TRIPs plus’ FTA can be justified. Unfortunately, given 
the current level of IPR-related industries of Korea that remain weaker in the 
international market, the Kor-U.S. FTA will only result in the ‘Kicking-away-the-
ladder’ effect on the Korea’s IPR-related industries. More importantly, the highest 
level of IPR protections shall be a fundamental obstacle when Korea as a national 
economy pursues to transform into a knowledge-based economy. Many of 
development economics texts say that the more advanced an economy gets, the 
more important knowledge as a production factor becomes. It is contradictory the 
Roh government insist that the FTA will help Korean economy transform to more 
advanced knowledge-based economy whilst adopting the strongest IPR protective 
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measures that shall hamper the development of knowledge-based industries.  
 
B. Undermining of Policy Space  
 
In the previous section, it was suggested that the Kor-U.S. FTA text presented little 
substantive evidences that the FTA will result in growth in GDP and employment, 
but it showed tangible threats that it shall undermine potentials for Korea’s further 
economic development.   
      More importantly, the Kor-U.S. FTA itself undermines the rights and 
capabilities of the Korean government and other public entities to implement, 
practice, modify, evaluate and when necessary annul its development policies. It 
came in many different forms in the text of the FTA. In the following, four factors 
will be considered: (a) Unilateral liberalization commitments; (b) Negative listing 
and ratchet principle; (c) ‘Future’ most favored nation (MFN) treatment; and (d) 
Investor-state dispute (ISD). 
 
Unilateral Liberalization Commitments 
 
The text of Kor-U.S. FTA includes a number of unilateral liberalization 
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commitments on the Korean side. Below are the examples of what Korea promised 
to do to the U.S. if the agreement enters into effect: 
 
-“By the date the Free Trade Agreement enters into force, Korea will amend Article 3 
of the Enforcement Decree of the Postal Service Act to expand the exceptions to the 
Korean Postal Authority’s monopoly to include all international document delivery 
services.”47    
-“Korea Post shall not issue new products, including variable life insurance, non-life 
insurance, and retirement insurance.”48 
-“Each party shall provide its authorities responsible for the enforcement of its 
national competition laws with the authority to resolve their administrative or civil 
enforcement by mutual agreement with the subject of the enforcement action.”4950 
-“Korea also agrees on the objective of shutting down Internet sites that permit 
unauthorized downloading (and other forms of piracy) of copyright works, including 
so-called webhard services, and providing for more effective enforcement of 
intellectual property rights on the Internet, including in particular with regard to peer-
to-peer(P2P) services.”51 
-“Korea will amend relevant laws and regulations to provide for a public comment 
period of no less than 40 days and will revise Article 14.1 of the Regulation on 
Administration of Legislative Affairs to remove the requirement to conduct 
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interagency consultations before the publication of proposed regulations for public 
comment.”52 
 
That the Korean government itself has vigorously pursued to deregulate and open 
the market is one thing, but to make it mandatory in form of a bilateral agreement 
is another thing. It is not a matter of whether ‘to leave it to the market mechanism’ 
policy or ‘to let it be under the control of the government’ is a better policy. Rather, 
it is important to recognize that the Korean government promises to the 3rd party 
to implement many policies that need to make a change on Korea’s current laws53. 
If a certain policy the Korean government currently pursues is not inside the 
scheme of a bilateral agreement, the government still has a grip on this policy and 
is able to give a change to it when the higher development objectives and 
accompanying strategies are changed. In this sense, the Kor-U.S. FTA seriously 
limits policy space for future development policies.  
  
Negative Listing and Ratchet Principle 
 
Another problem in relation to policy space is that the services/investment market 
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opening method the Kor-U.S. FTA adopts follows so-called ‘negative listing 
system’. In the negative listing system, services/investment areas and its relevant 
measures that a party want not to be applied by the FTA must be specified in the 
list titled ‘non-conforming measures’ list. What it implies is critical. If one area and 
its relevant measures are not listed in the text or if there is a new area that is 
created after the FTA enters into force, it is considered to be automatically 
liberalized. It severely challenges the Korean government’s ability to develop a 
new industrial area as part of nation-level development policies. Note that the 
multilateral WTO agreements and many other FTAs including the Korea-European 
Union (EU) FTA the government is currently negotiating adopt ‘positive listing 
system’, in which only opening areas and its relevant measures need to be listed.  
For sure, even after the FTA goes into effect, some of Korea’s critical 
polices are protected under the Annex and Annex  called ‘reservations to Ⅰ Ⅰ
existing measures’ and ‘reservations to future measures’, respectively. The Roh 
government has insisted that in the FTA negotiations with the U.S., it succeeded in 
protecting the government’s basic policy rights by listing every single critical 
policy and is relevant measure in theses two lists. For example, media-
telecommunication mixed area, which nobody knows at the time of negotiations 
how this area will be developing but everybody agrees that it will be one of future 
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strategic industries, is listed in the reservation list54.     
 But it is too early to say that the two lists will provide enough protections   
because the first reservations list Annex  has a fundamental limitⅠ ation that is 
called the ‘ratchet principle’. Ratchet principle means the government cannot put 
stricter limitation on the areas and measures listed in Annex .Ⅰ   
For instance, Korea’s Screen Quota system was listed in the Annex Ⅰ55. At 
a glance, the government’s right to deal with policies related to screen quota is 
reserved, but what it actually means that the Korean government cannot extend the 
current quota (73 days a year) even when the government decides to extend it to 
promote Korean movie industry. Furthermore, once the government reduces the 
quota to below 73 days a year, say 37 days a year, it cannot extend the quota back 
to over 37 days ‘for good’. In this way, the government’s policy space to deal with 
changing domestic/international environments keeps shrinking.  
Another example is Korea’s current restriction on a foreigner’s share of the 
facilities-based public telecommunication services supplier, which is also listed in 
the Annex Ⅰ. The annex says, “a foreign government, a foreign person or a 
deemed foreign person may not in the aggregate hold more than 49 percent of the 
total voting shares of a facilities-based supplier of public telecommunications 
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services.”56 It means the Korean government cannot raise the ceiling shares to 
above 49 percent. At the same time, it means that once the government lowers the 
ceiling shares, say to 30 percent, it cannot raise it ‘for any reason’ ‘for good’57.  
      All these imply that Korea will be left with smaller space for autonomous 
development policies once the Kor-U.S. FTA enters into force. 
 
‘Future’ Most Favored Nation (MFN) Treatment 
 
The Kor-U.S. FTA’s unique problem is that “most favored nation (MFN) 
treatment” shall be applied only to the free trade agreements the two signatories 
will be signing on ‘in the future,’ not to previously signed agreements before the 
Kor-U.S. FTA. The MFN treatment is one of basic FTA principles that a signatory 
nation shall provide the other signatory nation with no less than the most favored 
treatment given to the 3rd nations. Without this treatment, the FTA loses its 
meaning, because the very reason one country seeks for a bilateral FTA is it can get 
preferential treatment from the other country.    
      But in case of the Kor-U.S. FTA, somehow the Korean government agreed 
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 In addition, the reserved measure was followed by another commitment for an unilateral 
liberalization: “No later than two years after this Agreement enters into force, Korea shall permit: 
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Telecom Co., LTD.” 
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that this MFN treatment shall not apply to the other previous free trade agreements 
that the two countries signed on with other 3rd countries. On one hand, it means 
that all the preferential treatments that have given to 15 countries including Canada 
and Mexico, the biggest trade partners of the U.S., will not be given to Korea. It 
shows the expected benefits of the FTA on the Korean side will be significantly 
diminished. 
      However, this is only small part of the problem. So far, Korea signed on six 
FTAs with relatively small economies. And party because of this, the government 
is rigorously seeking for FTAs with many other countries including EU58, China, 
and Japan. It goes without saying that all these FTAs will be affecting the Kor-U.S. 
FTA. If there is one more liberalization measure or one more deregulation 
commitment included in these FTAs, it is automatically incorporated into the Kor-
U.S. FTA. It means Korea will have lesser and lesser space for its own 
development policies. In essence, the Kor-U.S. FTA is designed to automatically 
grow toward more market liberalizations/deregulations and less government power 
in terms of pursuing development policies.  
 
                                            
58
 Right after the Kor-U.S. FTA was signed on, the Korean government announced the launch of 
the Kor-EU FTA, and the negotiations are expected to be finished as early as late 2007 or early 
2008. 
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Investor-State Dispute (ISD) 
 
This is not the end of the story. It is critical to understand hat the biggest threat of 
the Kor-U.S. FTA in relation to one country’s autonomous development policies 
lies in so-called ‘investor-state dispute (ISD)’ that is incorporated in the chapter 11 
Investment of the FTA text. Investor-state dispute is a mechanism in which a 
foreign investor is allowed to submit a foreign nation (not only the administration 
but also the legislature and the judicature) to arbitration a claim when he/she 
believes and insists that its specific policy bleaches the expected return of his/her 
investment in that nation59. This mechanism was originally introduced in many 
bilateral investment treaties for the purpose of protecting foreign investors from 
unexpected political upheavals or land redistribution that can harm foreign 
investors’ investment. But recently it has developed from a protective method to an 
attacking tool that investors are attracted to use whenever they judge a policy or 
policies get in the way of their making profits60.    
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There are two-direction effects of the investor-state dispute on the development 
policy. One is that a foreign investor can directly make a certain policy obsolete by 
winning the arbitration. Basically every single policy can be the prey of ISD, but in 
particular, public polices related to public health, safety, the environment, labor, 
which by nature are supposed to interfere with foreign investment and which are 
very basic policies for sound development, are expected to distinguish as the 
number of ISD arbitration increases61. Also, real-estate related polices and taxation 
polices which are two crucial polices related to Korea’s development strategy are 
at stake, because those policies are not fully protected from possible attack of the 
ISD in the text62. In addition, if a country loses in the ISD arbitration, the amount 
of compensation charged to the nation will be substantial so that it eats up finances 
put aside for economic development.  
The other is so-called ‘chilling-effect’. The foreign investor can thwart a 
certain policy in an initiation stage merely by giving a hint to the foreign nation 
that “I will make use of ISD if the policy is implemented and thereby affects my 
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investment.” In other word, the very presence of the ISD will make the government 
and public entities hesitate to adopt a certain policy because it is afraid that it might 
get caught in the ISD arbitration and pay a lot of money which otherwise can be 
used in implementing the policy . In this way, the space for development policies 
will be shrinking. 
 
 
Ⅴ. CONCLUSION 
 
Korea has been the great example of how a nation could mix domestic 
endowments and changing global economies for a poor country to develop into a 
rich country with relatively low inequality. By signing on the Kor-U.S. FTA, the 
Korean government officially declared that the days of government-driven 
development policies are gone. It gives way to market openings, competitions and 
deregulations as substitutes for the basic policy tools for further development.     
But the Kor-U.S. FTA is a questionable development policy package, 
because it is based on wrong assumptions and argumentations on the Korean 
economy and its development direction. It was not ungrounded when the Roh 
government thought that Korea needed a new development strategy to address the 
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troubled economy, namely ‘jobless growth.’ But it was followed with a great 
number of sweeping assertions including ‘more exports’ to the U.S. market to beat 
China, ‘external shock therapy’ for the development of services sector. Besides, 
there is no substantive evidence that tightening Korea’s economic relation with the 
U.S. will provide the sound and sustainable development for Korea.     
Moreover, the Kor-U.S. FTA will function as a lock-in instrument that 
enforces the  Korean government and other public entities not to pursue 
autonomous and independent development polices. When unilateral liberalization 
commitment, the negative listing system applying to services/investment market 
liberalization and the ratchet principle, future most-favored-nation (MFN) 
treatment, and investor-state dispute (ISD) are combined, there is not much space 
left for Korea’s future development policies.  
      The contribution of this paper is not large. However, it is the first paper that 
deals with the Kor-U.S. FTA in terms of its implications for Korea’s development 
strategy. Without a clear blue print of what is Korea’s next development strategy 
and policies including industrial policies, letting the Kor-U.S. FTA replace of them 
is quite dangerous. If Korea wants to pursue free trade agreements for further 
economic development, the first rationale to be given is not that other countries are 
doing so, but that it is incorporated in the bigger picture that shows Korea’s future 
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economy.   
      Korea’s next step will be closely observed by many developing countries in 
the world. Unfortunately, Korea is now going into an historical experiment, instead 
of making its own development strategies. The key questions to remain to be 
answered are how to picture Korea’s future economy and find its unique 
development polices. 
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http://www.kosis.kr  Korean Statistical Information Service (KOSIS) of Korea 
National Statistical Office. 
http://www.oecd.org/statsportal  Organization for Economic and Development 
(OECD) Statistics Portal. 
http://www.mofat.go.kr/mofat/fta/eng_0707/eng_list.htm  The official texts of the 
Kor-U.S. FTA. 
